The Supreme Court saves time-sharing

For years, the validity of time-sharing contracts has been in question. Law 42/1998 was the first to regulate these contracts and, given the interpretation of its provisions maintained until now by the Supreme Court, numerous contracts for the transfer of this type of rights have been declared null and void. In this regard, the High Court of Justice had considered that: (i) once Law 42/1998 came into force, all contracts for the transfer of these rights had to be signed for a maximum term of 50 years (regardless of whether these regimes had been adapted so that the rights had an indefinite duration or a duration of more than 50 years); (ii) the contracts were null and void due to lack of object  if they had been configured in accordance with the so-called ‘floating regime’ (in which the rights refer to accommodation or determinable periods of time); and, finally, (iii) the failure to mention in the contract any of the elements established in Article 9 of the Law was grounds for declaring the corresponding contract null and void.

However, the recent judgments STS 1522/2025 and STS 1524/2025 have modified the interpretation held until now by the Supreme Court. In these judgments, the First Chamber revises its own doctrine and now considers that:

1. What is relevant in order to consider the fifty-year time limit enforceable is not the date of transfer of the right, but the manner in which the pre-existing regime was adapted to Law 42/1998. The rights derived from the pre-existing regimes must be promoted and transferred in accordance with the option chosen by the owners in the deed of adaptation registered at the Land Registry, and one possible option is the continuity of the pre-existing regime, so that the rights derived from those pre-existing regimes can continue to be marketed and transferred with the legal nature, form of exploitation and duration (indefinite or for a fixed term, without the limitation of fifty years as the maximum term) with which they were constituted.
2. Contracts are not void due to indeterminacy of the object because they are of a floatingnature, in which the rights refer to accommodation or determinable periods of time, provided that it is possible to specify them by means of the reservation procedure or other criteria provided for the determination of the accommodation or the time of enjoyment at any given moment.
3. The absence of any element of the minimum content required by Article 9 of Law 42/1998 does not render the contract radically void,but rather allows for the possibility of terminating the contract within three months of its signing (Article 10.2 of Law 42/1998).

This new criterion opens the door to defending the full validity of many contracts. For owners, marketers and tour operators, this doctrine provides greater legal certainty. It allows one to argue that many contracts remain fully operational, without the 50-year restriction and without minor defects in the minimum content or floating modality automatically leading to their declaration of nullity.

The Supreme Court’s doctrine consolidates a more flexible interpretation and drastically limits the cases of nullity. However, it is crucial to carry out an individualised examination of each contract to determine the best defence strategy in accordance with this new jurisprudential criterion